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NORTH DAKOTA: FLIPPING THE BIRD AT 
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
SINCE 2012 
Krisztina Nadasdy* 
Abstract: Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) it is a federal 
misdemeanor to kill a migratory bird “by any means, or in any manner.” 
In 2012, three oil and gas companies operating in the Bakken region of 
North Dakota were charged with violations of the MBTA after dead and 
oiled birds were found in and around their oil reserve pits. In United States 
v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., the companies challenged the violations by 
claiming that the MBTA applied only to conduct directed at birds, and 
not to lawful commercial activities that might result in the incidental 
death of birds. The District Court for the District of North Dakota agreed 
and dismissed the charges. This Comment argues that the motion to dis-
miss should not have been granted because the court’s interpretation of 
the MBTA’s scope is too narrow and runs counter to binding and persua-
sive precedent acknowledging that incidental killing is within the scope of 
the MBTA. 
Introduction 
 Western North Dakota is traditionally thought of as a quiet and 
remote place, or a “desolate, grim beauty” as Theodore Roosevelt once 
described it.1 Recently, however, Roosevelt’s words have taken on a dif-
ferent meaning, as this once quiet and remote area has suddenly be-
come the nation’s playground for oil and gas exploration in a way 
never experienced before.2 Some see beauty in the new jobs, increased 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 Laura Bly, North Dakota Towns Fuel a Well-Oiled Tourism Boom: ‘Carbon Rush’ Pits Beauty 
and Business, USA Today, Sept. 7, 2012, at 3D; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt (Aug. 17, 1884), in Letters from Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt 
Cowles 1870 to 1918, at 62, 63 (1924). 
2 Monica Davey, As Oil Flows in North Dakota, Job Boom and Burdens Follow, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
1, 2008, at A1; Clay Jenkinson, It’s Not Just an Oil Boom, It’s an Industrial Revolution, The Bis-
marck Tribune, July 15, 2012, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/columnists/clay-jenkin 
son/it-s-not-just-an-oil-boom-it-s-an/article_17f93572-cb75–11e1-a78b-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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wealth, and new technologies.3 For others, the situation has turned 
grim, with an increase in crime, traffic, air pollution, and cost of living.4 
 The culprit here is the Bakken formation, which has sat silently 
under North Dakota, Montana, and parts of Canada for millions of 
years and contains anywhere from ten billion to five-hundred billion 
barrels of oil.5 The formation was discovered in the early 1950s, but it 
was not until 2007—-with the introduction of horizontal drilling and 
fracking—-that oil and gas companies could extract large amounts of 
natural resources.6 More than four thousand new wells were drilled in 
the Bakken formation between 2007 and 2012, as compared to the 
three hundred wells drilled between 1953 and 2007.7 This unprece-
dented increase in oil and gas exploration seems to have left nothing in 
the area unaffected, including the birds.8 
 Birds are attracted to bodies of water, but are also attracted to oil 
reserve pits because they resemble bodies of water.9 As defined in 
North Dakota state law, a reserve pit is “an excavated area used to con-
tain drill cuttings . . . and mud-laden oil and gas drilling fluids . . . or 
water.”10 When a bird attempts to drink from a reserve pit, it can get 
caught in the oils and die from fatigue; alternatively, if the bird does 
not die in the pit it might die later or suffer long-term health prob-
lems.11 This phenomenon is problematic for oil and gas companies be-
cause under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Congress has 
made it a federal misdemeanor to “at any time, by any means or in any 
                                                                                                                      
3 Jenkinson, supra note 2; A. G. Sulzberger, Amid a Housing Shortage, a North Dakota Oil 
Boom Creates Camps of Men, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2011, at A12. 
4 Davey, supra note 2, at A1, A14; Kevin G. Hall, Boom & Busts: U.S. Oil Boom Comes with 
Tradeoffs and an Ugly Underbelly, Chattanooga Times Free Press, Sept. 22, 2012, at C3. 
5 Bakken Formation, U. of N.D. Energy and Envtl. Res. Center, http://www.undeerc. 
org/bakken/bakkenformation.aspx; Development History, U. of N.D. Energy and Envtl. 
Res. Center, http://www.undeerc.org/bakken/developmenthistory.aspx; Oil Production, 
U. of N.D. Energy and Envtl. Res. Center, http://www.undeerc.org/bakken/oil 
production.aspx (showing Bakken formation discovered in 1953). 
6 Davey, supra note 2, at A14; Jenkinson, supra note 2. 
7 Monthly Bakken Oil Production Statistics, N.D. Dep’t of Min. Res., https://www. 
dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf (including data through July 2012). 
8 See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203 (D.N.D. 
2012); Hall, supra note 3. 
9 Pedro Ramirez, Jr., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Reserve Pit Management: Risks 
to Migratory Birds 9 (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/contam- 
inants/documents/ReservePits.pdf. 
10 N.D. Cent. Code § 38–08–02 (2004). 
11 Ramirez, supra note 9. 
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manner . . . pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take, cap-
ture, or kill . . . any migratory bird.”12 
  In 2011, three oil and gas companies drilling in the Bakken for-
mation, Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. (“Brigham”), Newfield Production 
Company (“Newfield”), and Continental Resources, Inc. (“Continen-
tal”), challenged their liability under the MBTA after multiple migra-
tory birds were found dead in their reserve pits.13 The companies 
called for a narrow reading of the MBTA and claimed that it only ap-
plied to activities directed at wildlife such as hunting or poaching.14 The 
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota agreed 
with the companies and held that the MBTA misdemeanor provision 
applies only to those activities that are directed at wildlife—-an ex-
tremely narrow and counter-precedential reading of the MBTA.15 
 This Comment argues that in United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 
L.P., the court should not have granted the motion to dismiss. The 
MBTA misdemeanor provision is a criminal regulatory offense with no 
mental state requirement, which means it is up to the courts to decide 
who falls within its reach and who does not.16 I argue first that the Dis-
trict of North Dakota failed in its reasoning by adhering to unrelated 
precedent, thereby confusing the state of the law and effectively reject-
ing the well-established strict liability standard for the MBTA misde-
meanor provision.17 Second, I argue that a violation of the MBTA mis-
demeanor provision is an “innocent conduct offense” rather than a 
“public welfare offense.”18 In this framework, the conduct of Brigham, 
Newfield, and Continental is within the scope of the MBTA, and the 
court should have allowed the case to proceed.19 
                                                                                                                      
12 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006); Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 
1203. 
13 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203–1206. 
14 Defendants Brigham and Newfields’s Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss the Informations at 8, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (Nos. 4:11-po-00005-
DLH, 4:11-po-00009-DLH); Continental Resources, Inc.’s Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss at 8, 9, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 4:11-po-00004-DLH). 
15 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211; see infra notes 85–100 and accompanying text. 
16 Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Envi-
ronmental Example, 25 Envtl. L. 1165, 1173, 1175 (1995); see, e.g., Staples v. United States, 
511 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1994); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 535–36 
(E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). 
17 See infra notes 85–100 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 This case revolves around three companies engaged in oil and gas 
exploration in the Bakken formation: Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. (“Brig-
ham”), Newfield Production Company (“Newfield”), and Continental 
Resources, Inc. (“Continental”).20 
 Brigham owns an oil reserve pit on its drilling site, “Lippert,” lo-
cated in Williams County, North Dakota.21 Drilling started on the Lip-
pert site on June 20, 2010, and ended on November 14, 2010.22 On May 
6, 2011 an enforcement officer for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
in North Dakota found two dead mallards covered in oil in the reserve 
pit on the Lippert site.23 The pit was neither netted nor flagged at the 
time of inspection.24 
 Newfield owns an oil reserve pit on its drilling site, “Manolo,” lo-
cated in Williams County, North Dakota.25 Drilling started on the Ma-
nolo site on September 18, 2010, and ended on February 14, 2011.26 
On May 17, 2011, fluid from a reserve pit on the Manolo site over-
flowed into a nearby wetland, and on May 18, 2011, an inspector from 
the North Dakota Department of Health discovered two dead mallards 
at the wetland’s edge.27 A biologist from the North Dakota Game and 
Fish Department discovered a third dead and oiled duck in the same 
area on the same day.28 On the following day, May 19, an enforcement 
officer from the FWS discovered a fourth dead and oiled bird one 
hundred yards from the edge of the wetland.29 
 Continental owns a reserve pit on its drilling site, “Lokken,” lo-
cated in Williams County, North Dakota.30 Drilling began on the Lok-
                                                                                                                      
20 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. Initially, seven oil and gas companies were charged. Three 
companies entered into plea agreements with the government, and the government dis-
missed the charge against the fourth company. Id. 
21 Id. at 1204. 
22 Id. at 1205. 
23 Statement of Probable Cause at 1, 7, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 4:11-po-
00005-DLH)[hereinafter Brigham Probable Cause]. 
24 Id. “Reserve pit[s] used solely for drilling, completing, recompleting, or plugging” 
may remain uncovered during the drilling process but must be reclaimed no more than six 
months after completion, and must be netted if the pit is not reclaimed within ninety days 
of completion. N.D. Admin. Code 43–02–03–19, 43–02–03–19.1 (Apr. 2012). 
25 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. 
26 Statement of Probable Cause at 8, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 4:11-po-00009-
DLH)[hereinafter Newfield Probable Cause]. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1, 8. 
30 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
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ken site on January 27, 2011 and ended on May 6, 2011.31 On May 6, 
2011 an inspector from the FWS found a dead and oiled say’s phoebe 
at the reserve pit.32 The pit was neither netted nor flagged during the 
time of inspection.33 
 For Brigham, Newfield, and Continental, this was not the first time 
that the FWS found dead migratory birds on company property.34 Previ-
ously, the FWS had charged each company with violations of the 
MBTA.35 Additionally, the FWS sent each company information and 
guidance regarding the threat of reserve pits to migratory birds, and 
how to prevent future bird deaths.36 In light of the newest inspections 
and charges, the companies decided to challenge their liability under 
the MBTA and filed a motion to dismiss the charges, asserting that their 
lawful commercial activity—-which incidentally caused bird deaths—-was 
outside the scope of the MBTA.37 The United States District Court for 
the District of North Dakota granted the motion to dismiss, finding that 
the lawful commercial activity of oil and gas exploration is outside the 
purview of the MBTA.38 The court held the MBTA applies only to con-
duct directed at wildlife, such as hunting and poaching.39 
 The government appealed the unfavorable ruling to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, but then voluntarily 
dismissed its cases against Brigham, Newfield, and Continental pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b).40 
                                                                                                                      
31 Statement of Probable Cause at 8, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 4:11-po-00004-
DLH)[hereinafter Continental Probable Cause]. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4; Continental Probable Cause, supra 
note 31, at 5; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5. 
35 Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4; Continental Probable Cause, supra 
note 31, at 5; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5. 
36 Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4–5; Continental Probable Cause, supra 
note 31, at 5–6; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
37 Defendants Brigham and Newfields’s Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss the Informations, supra note 14; Continental Resources, Inc.’s Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 14, at 9. 
38 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203, 1211. 
39 Id. at 1213. 
40 Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)(“An appeal may be dismissed on the appellant’s motion on 
terms agreed to by the parties or fixed by the court.”); Motion of the United States for 
Voluntary Dismissal of Appeals Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) at 2, United States v. Con-
tinental Res., Inc., Nos. 12–1375, 12–1376, 12–1377 (8th Cir. dismissed Apr. 18, 2012)(Nos. 
12–1375, 12–1376, 12–1377). 
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II. Legal Background 
 The MBTA is a criminal statute that makes it “unlawful at any time, 
by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill [or] 
attempt to take, capture, or kill [or] possess . . . any migratory bird.”41 
Congress enacted the MBTA in 1918 after signing a treaty with Great 
Britain to protect migratory birds.42 Both countries agreed that migra-
tory birds were important “as a source of food [and for] destroying in-
sects which are injurious to forests and forage plants . . . as well as to 
agricultural crops.”43 
 As enacted, the MBTA contained no mental state requirement, and 
left any person, corporation, association, or partnership who in any way 
violated the Act vulnerable to punishment.44 As the case law surround-
ing the MBTA developed, most federal courts interpreted violation of 
the Act as a strict liability offense.45 The first district to interpret the 
MBTA as a strict liability offense was the Western District of Tennessee 
in the 1939 case United States v. Reese.46 The Reese court found “[t]he de-
duction is plain that Congress deliberately omitted scienter as an essen-
tial ingredient of the minor offense under consideration. . . . Congress 
clearly intended to make real the protection against the holocaustic 
slaughter of migratory birds.”47 After 1939 almost all circuit courts fol-
lowed suit and applied this reasoning to other provisions in the MBTA 
and over time established that a violation of the misdemeanor provision 
MBTA is a strict liability offense.48 Congress affirmed the strict liability 
standard in a Senate report accompanying a 1986 amendment adding a 
“knowingly” requirement to the felony provision by stating: “[n]othing 
                                                                                                                      
41 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006). Currently, the MBTA protects more than one thousand 
species of birds. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2011); News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Official 
Number of Protected Migratory Bird Species Climbs to More than 1,000 (Mar. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=1A6C3012-
D22E-4F75-ABD98CD33992DD42. 
42 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006); Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for 
the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, 1702. 
43 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Mi-
gratory Birds, supra note 42. 
44 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, § 6, 40 Stat. at 756. 
45 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. 
Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); S. Rep. No. 99–445, at 16 (1986), reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. But see United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th 
Cir. 1985). 
46 Reese, 27 F. Supp. at 835; Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict Criminal 
Liability for Non-Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 315, 318 (1999). 
47 Reese, 27 F. Supp. at 835. 
48 Corcoran, supra note 46, at 318 & n.17. 
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in this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for 
misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which 
has been upheld in many Federal court decisions.”49 
 Congress regularly uses statutes to regulate certain types of conduct 
deemed undesirable for public policy reasons.50 Similar to the MBTA, 
many of these criminal regulatory statutes have no mental state re-
quirement, and the courts must interpret an appropriate requirement, 
as absolute liability is not always suitable.51 A court may choose what sort 
of mental state to infer based on whether the court categorizes the viola-
tion as a “public welfare offense” or an “innocent conduct offense.”52 
 Recently, the Supreme Court discussed the distinction between 
public welfare offenses and innocent conduct offenses in Staples v. 
United States.53 The Court categorized public welfare offenses as viola-
tions of statutes that regulate dangerous and uncommon activities such 
as the possession of narcotics, the transportation of hazardous material, 
or labeling pharmaceuticals.54 The required mental state for a public 
welfare offense is low, the defendant must merely be aware that the 
conduct is of such a nature that it might be regulated.55 Innocent con-
duct offenses on the other hand, usually involve violation of statutes 
regulating commonplace activities that less endanger the public such as 
the illegal sale of food stamps.56 The required mental state for innocent 
conduct offenses is higher and requires that the defendant be aware of 
the specific facts that bring the conduct within the scope of the stat-
                                                                                                                      
49 S. Rep. No. 99–445, at 16; see, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th 
Cir. 1984). 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280–81 (1943) (mislabeled 
pharmaceuticals); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 252 (1922) (unlawful posses-
sion of narcotics). 
51 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (discussing Liparota v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 433 (1985)); see 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006). 
52 Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1203–04; see Staples, 511 U.S. at 608–13. The term pub-
lic welfare offense is well-established term used in case law when applicable. See Man-
diberg, supra note 16, at 1198. The term innocent conduct offense is a created term bor-
rowed and modified from a law review article meant to denote “everything else” that is not 
a public welfare offense, but still falls into the category of criminal regulatory offenses. See 
id. at 1199. 
53 See 511 U.S. at 608–16. 
54 Id. at 607 (citing United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564–
65 (1971); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281; Balint, 258 U.S. at 254). Public welfare offenses are 
also characterized by not having any history in the common law and by small penalties, 
which do not harm the reputation of the wrongdoer. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 255–56 (1952). 
55 Staples, 511 U.S. at 629 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433, 443, 
n.7). 
56 Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1203–04; see id. at 610. 
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ute.57 The statute at issue in the Staples case prohibits the possession of 
an unregistered automatic weapon.58 The Court concluded that viola-
tion of this statute was an innocent conduct offence because although 
gun ownership may be dangerous, it is a common phenomenon in 
America, and therefore the prosecution must prove a higher mental 
state in order to convict.59 
 The MBTA as a criminal regulatory statute has been applied to the 
conduct of commercial actors with varying results—-some courts have 
essentially exempted commercial actors while others analyze their viola-
tions as innocent conduct or public welfare offenses.60 Recently, in New-
ton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, a wildlife conservation 
group sued the U.S. Forest Service (USFS).61 The conservation group 
claimed that the USFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
by approving timber harvesting under the National Forest Manage-
ment Act (NFMA) while the agency was aware that timber harvesting 
would modify the habitats of migratory birds and possibly result in bird 
deaths.62 On appeal, the conservation group argued that the USFS 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the NFMA “because the agency 
ignored or violated its obligations under MBTA.”63 The Eighth Circuit 
found this argument unpersuasive and suggested that the MBTA 
should apply only to actions directed at migratory birds such as hunting 
and poaching.64 The court qualified this statement by acknowledging 
its assertions regarding the scope of the MBTA were “necessarily tenta-
tive” because the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) was not involved in the 
                                                                                                                      
57 Staples, 511 U.S. at 619. In the MBTA context, courts have expressed this heightened 
mental state requirement through proximate causation, requiring that the harm be rea-
sonably foreseeable. See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 690 (10th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (D. Colo. 
1999). Both proximate causation and the Staples “specific facts” language boil down to the 
same main idea—-the court requires “something more” than mere awareness that the de-
fendant is engaged in an activity that may be regulated. Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1199; 
see, e.g., Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 690; Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 
58 Staples, 511 U.S. at 605, 616 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)). 
59 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 610, 611, 619. Specifically, the prosecution had to prove that 
defendant knew his weapon was automatic, and not merely that defendant knew his con-
duct could be subject to regulation. Id. at 619. 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 
2012); Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 690; United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d 
Cir. 1978). 
61 Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997). 
62 Id. at 114, 115. 
63 Id. at 114. 
64 See id. at 115. 
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suit, and the FWS is the agency in charge of administering and enforc-
ing the MBTA.65 
 Other federal circuits and districts have dealt with commercial ac-
tor liability under the MBTA more directly.66 An early case addressing 
the issue was United States v. Corbin Farm Service, which the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California decided in 1978.67 
In Corbin, a producer and distributor of pesticides was charged with a 
violation of the MBTA after multiple migratory birds were found dead 
and poisoned on a field that had been improperly sprayed with pesti-
cides.68 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that prosecution 
under the MBTA is limited to hunting and poaching by noting “[t]he 
fact that Congress was primarily concerned with hunting does not . . . 
indicate that hunting was its sole concern.”69 The court determined 
that this violation of the MBTA was a public welfare offense because the 
defendant was dealing with dangerous pesticides, which should alert a 
person to regulation.70 
 In 2009, the Western District of Louisiana rejected the argument 
that lawfully operating oil companies are liable under the MBTA mis-
demeanor provision in United States v. Chevron USA, Inc.71 In that case, 
Chevron outfitted its wellhead with a steel structure called a “caisson.”72 
Later, Chevron found thirty-five dead birds in the space between the 
wellhead and the caisson and was charged with violating the MBTA.73 
The court did not analyze violation of the MBTA misdemeanor provi-
sion as a public welfare offense, and instead found Chevron’s conduct 
to be completely outside the scope of the Act.74 The court reasoned 
that the MBTA misdemeanor provision was “clearly not intended to 
apply to commercial ventures where, occasionally, protected species 
might be incidentally killed as a result of totally legal and permissible 
activities.”75 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
67 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). 
68 Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 514–15. 
69 Id. at 531–32. 
70 See id. at 535–36. 
71 No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009). 
72 Id. at *1. Caissons are used to protect wellheads from damage, and once installed, 
resembles a large steel pipe surrounding the outside of the wellhead. Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at *3, *4. 
75 Id. at *3. 
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 In 2010, the Tenth Circuit heard a similar case involving oil and 
gas companies, United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.76 In this case, two 
Kansas oil operators, Apollo and Walker, were charged with violations 
of the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA after dead birds were 
found lodged in both operators’ heater-treaters.77 The defendants 
claimed the MBTA was “unconstitutional as applied to their conduct.”78 
The court cited Staples in affirming “the basic proposition that public 
welfare or regulatory offenses can impose a form of strict criminal li-
ability,” and found the MBTA misdemeanor violation requires a higher 
mental state than what is required for a public welfare offense.79 The 
court used the concept of foreseeability to frame its analysis.80 The 
court found Apollo liable under the MBTA in part because on a prior 
occasion FWS found dead birds in Apollo’s heater-treaters.81 Instead of 
prosecuting this violation, FWS initiated a regional awareness campaign 
about heater-treaters and migratory bird mortality—-but when the 
campaign finished, FWS found more dead birds in Apollo’s heater-
treaters and initiated prosecution.82 The court reasoned that conviction 
was fair in this case because Apollo knew its heater-treaters had killed 
birds in the past, and as part of the education campaign, was aware of 
the threat that heater-treaters posed to migratory birds.83 The court, 
however, dismissed some charges against Walker because it was not part 
of the awareness campaign and had no prior experience with birds dy-
ing in its heater-treaters.84 
III. Analysis 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota in United 
States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., held that the MBTA misdemeanor pro-
vision applies only to physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunt-
                                                                                                                      
76 611 F.3d 679, 681–82 (10th Cir. 2010). 
77 Id. at 682. Heater-treaters are common devices used in oil drilling. Id. A heater-
treater is a piece of cylindrical equipment that can extend up to twenty feet tall and more 
than three feet wide, and its function is to separate the oil from the water after the oil-
water mixture is pumped from the ground. Id. The heater-treaters in this case have ex-
haust pipes into which birds can crawl. Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 686 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)) (internal quota-
tions omitted), see id. at 690. 
80 Id. at 690. 
81 Id. at 682, 691. 
82 Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 682–83. 
83 Id. at 682–83, 691. 
84 Id. at 691. Walker was charged with violations in 2007 and 2008; the court dismissed 
the 2007 charge for lack of foreseeability and notice, but upheld the 2008 charge. Id. 
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ers and poachers.85 The court relied on dicta from Newton County Wild-
life Association v. U.S. Forest Service, which resulted in the court forging a 
nonsensical distinction between indirect and direct conduct.86 Instead 
of applying the dicta from a civil suit, and fully exempting commercial 
actors not engaged in conduct directed at birds from MBTA liability, 
the court should have assessed the situation in light of the MBTA’s role 
as a criminal regulatory statute.87 
 In coming to its overly narrow interpretation of the scope of the 
MBTA misdemeanor provision, the Brigham court inappropriately 
bound itself to dicta in Newton County, but Newton County and Brigham 
are not two birds of a feather.88 First, Newton County was a civil case 
brought by a wildlife conservation organization under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act with no involvement by the Fish & Wildlife Service 
(FWS).89 The case was premised on possible future bird deaths from a 
timber harvesting operation.90 The MBTA, however, is a criminal stat-
ute punishing actual harms.91 Without the involvement of the FWS and 
prosecutors, any conclusions as to the scope of the MBTA are “necessar-
                                                                                                                      
85 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012) (“This Court expressly finds that the use 
of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity that 
stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Like timber harvesting, 
oil development and production activities are not the sort of physical conduct engaged in 
by hunters and poachers, and such activities do not fall under the prohibitions of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act.”). 
86 See id. at 1211 (citing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 
115 (8th Cir. 1997)); see United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 
(D. Colo. 1999) (noting that when interpreting the MBTA a “distinction between an ‘indi-
rect’ and ‘direct’ ‘taking’ is illogical”). 
87 Cf. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. C-06–563, 2012 WL 3866857, at 
*6–8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012) (refraining from exempting commercial actors from MBTA 
liability and analyzing the MBTA as a criminal regulatory statute to find defendants liable 
because defendant’s uncovered oil tanks were unlawful, and bird deaths as a result of ex-
posure to oil tanks was foreseeable). But cf. United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-
0132, 2009 WL 3645170, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009) (finding that companies engaged 
in lawful commercial activities that incidentally result in bird deaths are not liable under 
the MBTA). The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota is not the only juris-
diction in which a court has made a blanket statement about a certain group’s liability 
under the MBTA rather than analyzing the facts of the case through the criminal regula-
tory framework. See id. This Comment, however, argues that a violation of the MBTA 
should be analyzed in the criminal regulatory framework because this is consistent with 
precedent and congressional intent. See infra notes 101–105, and accompanying text. 
88 See Newton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 115; Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. 
89 Newton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 114, 115. Congress delegated exclusive power to the Secre-
tary of Interior to administer and enforce the MBTA. 16 U.S.C. §§ 706, 709a (2006). The 
FWS is in charge of enforcing the MBTA. Newton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 115. 
90 Newton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 115. 
91 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 707. 
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ily tentative” because it is unclear whether the United States would have 
even pursued the case in the first place.92 Unlike Newton County, in Brig-
ham the United States voiced its opinion on the scope of the MBTA and 
chose to prosecute defendant companies after multiple migratory birds 
were found dead in and around their reserve pits.93 
 After a detailed discussion of Newton County, the Brigham court 
forged a distinction between indirect and direct conduct as a way to 
limit the scope of the MBTA.94 This distinction adds an intent require-
ment to the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA, requiring the prose-
cution to prove that a defendant directed its conduct towards wildlife.95 
It also conflicts with the existing Eighth Circuit decisions that declined 
to read a scienter element into the MBTA.96 
 The Brigham court’s distinction between indirect and direct con-
duct led to its conclusion that the MBTA is limited to hunting and 
poaching, but legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not in-
tend to limit the MBTA in this way.97 In 1918, Congress was aware of 
other threats to migratory birds, such as agriculture and draining of 
swamps.98 Today, migratory birds are also threatened by sources such as 
pesticides, skyscrapers, wind turbines, and oil reserve pits, which were 
not even conceivable when Congress enacted the MBTA.99 Until Con-
gress repeals or substantially narrows the MBTA to encompass only 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. § 706 (delegating authority to Department of Interior to make arrests); New-
ton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 115 (noting its conclusions regarding the MBTA are “necessarily ten-
tative” because the FWS expressed no views on the proceeding). 
93 Compare Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 1 (FWS involvement), with New-
ton Cnty., 113 F.3d at 115 (no FWS involvement). 
94 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. 
95 See id.; Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
96 See United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986); Rogers v. United 
States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966). 
97 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211, 1212; e.g., United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 
F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (reasoning 
for pesticides dealer that “[t]he legislative history of the Act reveals no intention to limit 
the Act so that it would not apply to poisoning”); Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 
(“[T]here is no clearly expressed legislative intent that the MBTA regulates only physical 
conduct associated with hunting or poaching.”). 
98 See H.R. Rep. No. 65–243, at 2 (1918) (letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
to the President) (“Not very many years ago vast numbers of . . . birds nested within the 
limits of the United States . . . but the extension of agriculture, and particularly the drain-
ing on a large scale of swamps and meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast 
increase in the number of sportsmen, have so altered conditions that comparatively few 
migratory game birds nest within our limits.”) (quoting the Department of Agriculture). 
99 See Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; Migratory Bird Mortality: Many Human-Caused 
Threats Afflict our Bird Populations, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 1–2 (2002), www.fws. 
gov/birds/mortality-fact-sheet.pdf. 
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those threats to birds that existed in 1918, the MBTA should evolve con-
gruently with changing times and apply to new threats as they appear.100 
 Instead of relying on Newton County’s non-binding precedent and 
in essence writing a scienter requirement into the MBTA misdemeanor 
provision, the Brigham court should have analyzed the situation as a vio-
lation of a criminal regulatory statute. Within this framework, the 
MBTA misdemeanor provision is better categorized as an innocent 
conduct offense rather than a public welfare offense.101 On its face, the 
MBTA is meant to regulate the amount of bird deaths through an out-
right prohibition on the killing, taking, and possession of migratory 
birds.102 The act of killing, taking, or possessing a bird is not dangerous 
to humans or property in the same way that mislabeled pharmaceuti-
cals, grenades, and hazardous wastes are.103 Viewing violation of the 
MBTA misdemeanor provision as an innocent conduct offense com-
ports with the strict liability standard while at the same time avoiding 
the constitutional problems that may occur through categorizing viola-
tion as a public welfare offense.104 Prosecuting a violation of the mis-
demeanor provision as a public welfare offense may result in a crimi-
nalization of a wide range of innocent conduct considering the 
exorbitant number of birds that are killed as a result of completely law-
ful activities and accidents.105 
  Viewing the offenses of the defendants in Brigham as innocent 
conduct offenses, the standard set forth in Staples requires that the 
                                                                                                                      
100 William n.Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 
1539–41, 1540 n.247 (1987) (offering multiple examples of the Supreme Court incorpo-
rating present day conditions into the interpretation of old statutes). 
101 See Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1215. Advocates who argue that violation of the 
MBTA is a public welfare offense usually have a different base of analysis. Id. at 1216, 1218; 
see, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Corbin, 444 F. Supp. 
at 536. For example, in Corbin, the court did not base the finding of a public welfare of-
fense on the plain language of the statute; rather it examined the specific way in which the 
birds were killed. See 444 F. Supp. at 535–36. The court reasoned the violation was a public 
welfare offense because the offender was using toxic pesticides that should have alerted 
the offender to regulation, not because the killing of birds itself is dangerous. See id. This is 
a possible path of analysis, but the Supreme Court has consistently based determination of 
public welfare offenses on the nature of the regulated activity in the statute, and not the 
specific facts surrounding each case. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994); 
Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1218. 
102 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). 
103 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607, 610; Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1198–99, 1215. 
104 See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“When the MBTA is stretched to criminalize predicate acts that could not have been rea-
sonably foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the statute reaches its constitu-
tional breaking point.”). 
105 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a); Migratory Bird Mortality, supra note 99. 
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prosecution prove that the defendants were aware of the specific facts 
that brought their conduct within the scope of the act.106 This means 
that the prosecution would have to prove that each company was aware 
that its reserve pits could kill birds.107 
 The facts in Brigham are very similar to the facts surrounding one 
of the companies in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.108 Apollo, unlike 
its co-defendant Walker, foresaw the threat that its heater-treaters posed 
to migratory birds.109 FWS had previously found dead birds in Apollo’s 
heater-treaters and included Apollo in an awareness campaign regard-
ing the threats that heater-treaters posed to migratory birds.110 Accord-
ingly, the Tenth Circuit found that Apollo Energies was aware of the 
specific facts that brought it under the scope of the MBTA and upheld 
the conviction.111 The defendants in Brigham found themselves in an 
almost identical situation to Apollo: they each had previous violations 
under the MBTA and FWS sent detailed letters regarding the threats 
that oil reserve pits posed to migratory birds.112 
  Brigham, Newfield, and Continental were each aware of the exis-
tence of the MBTA and of the specific facts that brought their conduct 
within its scope, thereby satisfying the mental state requirement for in-
nocent conduct offenses.113 For this reason, the District of North Da-
kota should have allowed the case to proceed and not dismissed it. 
Conclusion 
 The MBTA misdemeanor provision is a criminal statute with broad 
applicability and small penalties enacted for the purpose of protecting 
migratory birds. As such, it is part of a well-established collection of 
                                                                                                                      
106 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 619. 
107 See id. Different courts have described this requirement in different ways. See Apollo 
Energies, 611 F.3d at 690; Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. Whether addressed through 
Staples analysis or proximate causation, the same question must be answered—-whether 
Brigham, Newfield, and Continental knew enough about their conduct as to bring it with-
in the scope of the MBTA. See supra note 57. 
108 See 611 F.3d at 682–83, 691; Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4–5; Conti-
nental Probable Cause, supra note 31, at 5–6; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5–
6. 
109 See Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 691. 
110 Id. at 682–83. 
111 Id. at 691. 
112 See Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4–5; Continental Probable Cause, su-
pra note 31, at 5–6; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
113 Brigham Probable Cause, supra note 23, at 4–5; Continental Probable Cause, supra 
note 31, at 5–6; Newfield Probable Cause, supra note 26, at 5–6; see Staples, 511 U.S. at 619; 
Mandiberg, supra note 16, at 1203–04. 
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criminal regulatory statutes used by Congress as a means of regulating 
certain conduct. The legislative history surrounding the enactment of 
the MBTA indicates no intent on the part of Congress to limit the stat-
ute to hunting and poaching violations. Nevertheless, this is exactly 
what the District of North Dakota held in United States v. Brigham Oil & 
Gas, L.P. The court’s holding was a result of reliance on non-binding 
precedent and a narrow reading of the MBTA instead of an analysis of 
the violation as a criminal regulatory offense. 
 The MBTA does not regulate the type of dangerous conduct that 
warrants the lowest level of mental states, however, it still does not re-
quire the prosecution to prove the existence of scienter. Instead, courts 
should interpret the MBTA to require that the offender be aware of the 
specific facts of his or her conduct that cause bird deaths. In this case, 
Brigham, Newfield, and Continental were all aware that their oil re-
serve pits could cause bird deaths, and thus the case against them 
should not have been dismissed. 
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